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The U.S. policy toward China during the Nixon presidency

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**THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA
DURING THE NIXON PRESIDENCY**

**A Thesis presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Social Science**

SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

by

TUAN KHAC TRUONG

August 1989

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
T. K. T

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
Let me tell you what the world would be like if I had not taken the trip to Peking. One-fourth of all the people in the world live in the People's Republic of China.... They are among the ablest people in the world. Their government is a Communist government. I do not agree with their philosophy. We will continue to have differences with their government. We will have disagreements with their philosophy. But if a billion people in the world, 10, 15, 20 years from now, were lined up in confrontation against the United States of America it would be a dangerous world.

I had to take the steps now to reduce that danger. We have done it so we have a better chance for a generation of peace for our young Americans.

President Richard Nixon, 1972

Source : DuPre Jones, China U.S. Policy since 1945. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 54





ABSTRACT

THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA DURING THE NIXON PRESIDENCY

By Tuan Khac Truong

This thesis addresses the topic of the U.S. policy toward China during the Nixon presidency. It examines the reasons that cause the United States and China to consider even the secondary differences and to sit down together to seek their common interests. Moreover, they allied in a number of areas in order to make way for the balance of power and the reorientation of economic and political activities in the world.

The events dealt with are dominated by Nixon's foreign policies, especially their effect on the broader world scene in recent decades as well as their importance for the future. This thesis emphasizes the reasons that have influenced the U.S. policy and its consequences in political and economic aspects as well.

The body of this thesis is divided essentially into four parts. Chapter I deals with the historical background and current setting. Chapter 2 outlines the main factors of the U.S. policy toward China. Chapter 3 deals with difficult aspects of that policy -- questions relating to Taiwan and its future. A concluding section sums up the main impact as well as influences on the political and economic policies of the U.S., China and the rest of the world.

INTRODUCTION

One of the major tasks of the U.S. foreign policy during Nixon's presidency was to work toward a new basis for improved relations with Communist China.

For more than two decades, Washington and Peking faced each other as hostile adversaries in Asia. Each viewed the other as threatening its interest and security. In Korea, the U.S. and China fought a bitter war; in several other crises, they came close to military conflict. Today, more than a quarter of a century after the establishment of the People's Republic

of China in Peking, there are formal diplomatic relations between the most

the balance of power and the reorientation of economic and political activities in the world?

In "Chou En-lai, Nixon toasts" in Peking Feb. 21, 1972, Nixon said: "... the Chinese people are a great people, the American people are a great people. If our two people are enemies the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased....the world watches, the world listens, the world waits to see what we will do..."¹

On his return from Peking, Feb. 28, 1972, at Andrews Air Force Base, Nixon declared:

"... When I announced this trip last July, I described it as a journey for peace. In the last 30 years, American have in three different wars gone off by the hundreds of thousands to fight, and some to die, in Asia and in the Pacific. One of the central motives behind my journey to China was to prevent that from happening a fourth time to another generation of Americans ." ²

At Kansas City, in a speech given by President Nixon to Midwestern News Media, he stated:

"... The very success of our policy of ending the isolation of Mainland China will mean an immense escalation of their economic challenge not only to us but to others in the world ...
... What we see as we look ahead 5 years , 10 years, perhaps it is 15, but in any event, within our time we see five great economic super

¹ William Dickinson, Jr., History Document 1972, (Chou En-lai, Nixon toasts were exchanged in Peking, Feb. 21, 1972 during Nixon's visit).(Washington , D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,1973) p.186

² Nixon on China Talks, excerpts from President Nixon's remarks made at Andrews Air Force Base. Washington, D.C: , on his return from Peking, Feb. 28, 1972. See attached document, p.119.

powers: The United State, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Mainland China, and of course, Japan ... " ³

From these words, nobody can deny the importance of the issue; nobody can ignore its consequences for the whole world.

In trying to identify the causes of this historic action, we can discover the current interrelationship of world powers as well as its consequences, which in turn enable us to forecast the future trend of international economies and politics.



Chiang Kai-shek
(1887-1975)

(Jiang Jieshi)

³ Nixon Trade Speech, excerpts of a speech given by President Nixon to Midwestern News Media executives attending a briefing on domestic policy in Kansas City, MO., July 6, 1971. See attached document, p.106.

STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

June 1950 China's entry into the war in November cemented U.S.

support for Chiang. Opposition to Peking and support for Taiwan were codified by the mutual defense treaty with the Nationalists on December 2, 1954, and the Formosa resolution on January 28, 1955.⁴

American aid, the real income was doubled. The U.S. provided almost \$1.5 billion in economic aid in the 15 years prior to termination of the economic aid program on June 30, 1965.⁵

On the other hand, the U.S. declared that in its view the Chinese Communist regime was illegitimate, that Communism in China should be viewed as "a passing and not a perpetual state," that "Peking was both aggressive and expansionist," that it was an integral part of the "monolithic world of communism", subordinate to Moscow, and that it should be militarily contained, diplomatically and politically isolated, and subjected to economic and other pressures designed to limit its power and influence, weaken it, and help bring about its ultimate demise.⁶

Mao Tse-tung
(1893-1976)

(Mao Zedong)




⁵ The Nixon Doctrine and China. President Nixon's second Annual State of the World Report, delivered Feb. 25, 1971. See attached document, p.93,

⁶ A. Doak Barnett. A New U.S. Policy toward China (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971.), p. 17.

On the basis of such premises, the U.S. continued to oppose recognition of the Peking regime and maintained that the Republic of China on Taiwan should be viewed as the legitimate government of all China. The U.S. also attempted to discourage other nations from recognizing Peking. The U.S. strongly opposed the seating of Communist China in the U.N. and took the lead each year in mobilizing the necessary votes to keep the issue off the U.N. agenda. The U.S. continued to impose a total embargo on all American trade with Communist China and exerted pressures on other nations to maintain the extensive trade restrictions that they had agreed to adopt during the Korean War. The U.S. opposed even non-official travel and contacts and attempted to hinder other nations from developing broader relations. In addition, the U.S. gradually constructed around China a network of anti-Communist alliances, both bilateral and multilateral, encompassing a large number of the non-Communist nations to which it gave economic and military aid. Finally, the U.S. built an extensive system of military bases on China's periphery designed to deter or, if necessary, to combat the spread of Communist control or influence wherever any threats might appear.⁷ As part of this policy, the U.S. signed a mutual defense pact with the Chinese Nationalist regime in 1954, and resolution in 1955. At the time of the Bandung Conference held in Djakarta, Indonesia, in the spring of 1955 when Premier Chou En-lai

⁷ U.S. Encirclement of China, 1950-1968. Map 1, p. 7



first proposed diplomatic talks with the U.S.; Secretary of State Dulles, however, opposed such a move.⁸

For nearly fifteen years after that, U.S.-Peking relations were essentially stalemated, as America's escalating involvement in another Asian land war (this time in Vietnam) perpetuated the mutual hostility between China and the U.S. Nonetheless, ambassadorial level talks went on in Geneva and Warsaw during that period, ending only after the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970.

China, meanwhile, was suffering the internal upheavals of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which began in the mid-1960's and resulted in a period of political polarization, confusion, and stifling of dissent. The cultural revolution generated a concomitant decline in China's influence over smaller communist countries, which drifted into the Soviet orbit or into neutrality.⁹

On the other hand, during that period, the hostility between China and the Soviet Union had intensified; it even exceeded the prevailing autogamism between China and the United States as well as the discordant relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Not only in their dealings with each other but in the broader world community,

⁸ A. Doak Barnett, A New U.S. Policy toward China, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 13; Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) p. 565

⁹ DuPre Jones, China-US Policy since 1945, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980.), p. 199.

Peking and Moscow engaged in bitter polemical debate and intense political competition that had far reaching effects on both the atmospherics and the realities of contemporary international relations.¹⁰

The Sino-Soviet alliance of the early 1950's was permanently broken. Increasing autogamism characterized Sino-Soviet relations at this time.¹¹

~~The escalating confrontation evolved as follows: Ideological~~

cultural, political and economic factors aggravated the dispute, but issues relating to military security were the crucial ones at the three turning points: in 1957 - 1959, when the strains created doubts about alliance on both sides; in 1962 -1963, when the alliance became a dead letter for all practical purposes; and in 1968 -1969, when the political confrontation between the two countries was transformed into a military confrontation.¹²

That situation weakened the unity of the Communist block, and affected the worldwide struggle against the capitalist world adversely.¹³

¹⁰ Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations, (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1984), p. 23

¹¹ Richard Lowenthal, "Russia and China: Controlled Conflict." Foreign Affairs, No. 3, 49 April 1971, p. 153.

¹² "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute" Military Review, No. 1, 50 Jan. 1970, p. 82


¹³ A. Doak Barnett, China and Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 32

TABLE 1

BORDER CLASHES OF 1969

(1)	March 2	Ussuri River, Damansky Island
(2)	March 14 - 15	Ussuri River, Damansky Island
(3)	March 30 (?)	Eastern border, near Sui-fen-ho
(4)	April 16	Sinkiang border, near Chuguchak
(5)	April 17	Sinkiang border, near Chuguchak
(6)	April 25	Sinkiang border, near Chuguchak
(7)	May 2	Sinkiang border, near Yu-min
(8)	May 12 -15	Amur River, near Hu-ma
(9)	May 14	Amur River, near Ai-hui
(10)	May 20	Sinkiang border, near Irtys River
(11)	May 20	Sinkiang border, near Chuguchak
(12)	May 25	Amur River, near Blagoveshchensk
(13)	May 28	Amur River, Goldinsky Island
(14)	June 10	Sinkiang border, near Yu-min
(15)	July 8	Amur River, Goldinsky Island
(16)	August 8	Sinkiang border, near Yu-min

Source: Adapted from Strategic Survey 1969, (London : The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), pp. 100-102

BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AREA

SOURCE: Strategic Survey 1973 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 67

Generally, the split in Sino-Soviet relations was an important factor in causing the U.S. to adjust its global policies, especially in improving Sino - American relations.¹⁴

The New Trends in the U.S. Policy

The situation just mentioned above took place in a cautious step-by-step fashion. Attitudes began to change during the Kennedy administration. One of the first concrete steps occurred in late 1963, when Assistant Secretary of

State Roger Hilsman, Jr. called for an "open door" in the U.S.-Chinese relations. Three years later, in 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson went further and stated that our ultimate policy goal is "reconciliation" with Communist China. During 1969 and 1970, President Richard M. Nixon articulated the new aims of our China policy in even clearer terms and defined a new posture.

In his first foreign policy message to the Congress in February, 1970, Nixon stated that our aim now was to establish a "more normal and contractive relationship" with Communist China while recognizing "the gulf of ideology between us" and "the apparent differences in interests" and

declaring that "we will not ignore hostile acts." He nevertheless asserted that

the U.S. has "historical friendship with the Chinese people and has a

the international community". The U.S. intended, Nixon indicated, "to take what steps we can toward improved practical relations" and "will seek to promote understanding which can establish a new pattern of mutually beneficial actions." "The principles underlying our relations with Communist China," he asserted, "are similar to those governing our policies toward the USSR."¹⁵

Economically, on July 21, 1969, the State Department announced a slight easing of travel and trade restrictions. American tourists and residents abroad were allowed to bring into the U.S. \$100 worth of Chinese Communist-origin goods for non-commercial purpose. In addition, scholars, professors, journalists, university students, members of Congress, scientists, physicians, and Red Cross representatives were automatically entitled to have their passports validated for travel to mainland China.

In November 1969, the administration quietly ended the regular two-destroyer patrol (of the 7th fleet) in the Taiwan Strait. On December 19, 1969, the government announced that subsidiaries and offshoots of the U.S. firms abroad would be permitted to sell non-strategic goods to Communist China and buy Communist Chinese products for resale in foreign markets.

¹⁵ A. Doak Berrnett. A New U.S. Policy toward China. (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 16,17; Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 545

Individuals would be able to bring Chinese products into the U.S. for non-commercial purposes without limit on their value.¹⁶

Chou En-lai
(1898-1976)

(Zhou Enlai)



Peaceful Overtures

Initiatives in 1970. Despite the official non-recognition policy, the following tentative steps toward normalization between the two nations were undertaken in 1970 by the Nixon administration:

- The U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial talks resumed in Warsaw after a two-year lapse.
- The selective licensing of goods for export to Communist China was authorized by the United States.

¹⁶ DuPre Jones, China -US Policy since 1945. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 7

- The president noted that in 1970, 270 Americans had their passports validated for travel to the People's Republic of China. This brought the total number to nearly 1,000, even though only three Americans had been permitted entry.

In a foreign policy speech in early 1971, Nixon said that these unilateral efforts would continue. Although Peking had made no new overtures to the United States and had given no indication of resuming the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, again suspended in May 1970, it had moderated its tone in foreign policy and had established diplomatic relations with Canada, Italy and Chile.

The president repeated the U.S. commitment to the government of Nationalist China on Taiwan. But, he said, "The United States is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations." ¹⁷

For the first time the president referred to Communist China by its formal name, the People's Republic of China. Although his message to Congress and the nation did not include substantive changes in U.S.-China policy, it revealed a trend toward increased dialogue and contact with the Chinese people.

"The 22-year-old hostility between ourselves and the People's Republic of China is another unresolved problem, serious indeed in view of

¹⁷ The Nixon Doctrine and China. President Nixon's second annual State of the World Report. Delivered Feb. 25, 1971. See attached document , p.93 .

the fact that it determines our relationship with 750 million talented and energetic people," the president said. He continued: "For the United States, the development of a relationship with Peking embodies precisely the challenges of this decade: to deal with, and resolve vestiges of the postwar period that continue to influence our relationship and to create a balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake. We believe that such a structure should provide full scope for the influence to which China's achievements entitle it."

Pingpong Diplomacy No one expected, however, that the game of Ping-Pong would be the vehicle for a breakthrough between the two countries.

"The ping heard round the world," as Time magazine put it, was first sounded on April 6, 1971, during the international championship table tennis competition in Nagoya, Japan, when the team from China invited members of the American team to visit the mainland before returning to the United States. No group of Americans had been allowed into China since the Communists took control in 1949. "We have also extended the invitation for the sake of promoting friendship between the people of China and the United States," the spokesman for the Chinese team said.¹⁸

The invitation was accepted, and on April 10, 1971, the 15 Americans--nine players, four officials and two wives--walked across a bridge from Hong Kong into Chinese territory, where they were greeted by

¹⁸ DuPre Jones, China-U.S. Policy since 1945. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 1980.), p. 9

a delegation of smiling officials who escorted them to a train and took them to Canton. During the week of their visit, the Americans were kept on a full schedule of sightseeing, playing and entertainment.

They visited Peking, Shanghai, the Great Wall, a university and a rural commune. They participated in an exhibition Ping-Pong match before a cheering audience of 18,000, attended a ballet staged by the wife of Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and were guests at a party April 14, 1971, at which Premier Chou En-lai engaged the visitors at length in good-humored chitchat. Chou impressed the visitors as a surprisingly genial host. In his formal greetings to them, he said:

"You have opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American people. I am confident that this beginning again of our friendship will certainly meet with the majority support of our two people."¹⁹

Deng Xiaoping
(1904-)

(Teng Hsiao-p'ing)



¹⁹ Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 710

Equally significant with the invitation of the players, Peking

permitted five American newsmen to enter China to report the trip. Chou

said at the April 14 party that more American journalists would be granted visas to come to China, although "they cannot all come at one time."

On the day that Chou talked with the American players, April 14, 1971, the White House announced that a 20-year embargo on trade with China would be relaxed. The announcement stated:

- Visas for visitors from the People's Republic of China would be expedited.
- U.S. currency controls (imposed in 1950) would be relaxed so that China could use dollars to pay for exports.
- American oil companies would be allowed to provide fuel to ships or planes going to or from Chinese ports (except on Chinese-owned or chartered craft going to or from North Vietnam, North Korea or Cuba).
- U.S. vessels would be permitted to carry Chinese cargo between non-Chinese ports; U.S.-owned foreign flag carriers would be allowed to

th at the Defense Department wanted to keep it off the list. The Pentagon's

opposition to the sale of locomotives was also known, and they did not appear on the list .

Kissinger's secret trip Messages and signal had been going back and forth between China and the U.S. This mutual probing had happened with the help of various intermediaries including the French, Rumanians and Pakistani, including President Yahya Khan and President Ceausescu.²⁰

Because of these positive actions, on April 6, 1971, Nixon proposed that Kissinger visit China first, arrange an agenda, and begin a preliminary exchange of intentions and expectations.²¹

Henry Kissinger's dramatic secret trip to China took place in July 1971. In Peking, he had long discussions with Premier Chou on many issues, including Taiwan and Vietnam, and accepted Chou's invitation for Nixon to come to China.²²

Kissinger's visit laid the groundwork for Nixon and Mao to write an extraordinary page in history. The profound differences and years of isolation would be breached between the U. S. and China. This summit between the leaders of two huge nations would cover many major issues,

²⁰ A.Doak Barnett, China Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,1977). p.5

including the status of Taiwan, and open the door to greater and more open discourse.²³

Nixon Breakthrough The dramatic thaw in relations took a new turn on

On October 20, 1971, Kissinger made a second trip to Peking to make "concrete" plans for President Nixon's China visit. Upon returning, he announced on October 27, 1971 that Nixon would visit China after the first of the year.

Chinese Response During 1971, China's foreign policy continued to evolve away from its earlier, ideological approach. On May 1, 1971, the *People's Daily* published an editorial defending the move and

extolling the benefits that would accrue from "friendly exchanges between the peoples of various countries."

On August 2, 1971, the Chinese Communist Party theoretical journal, *Hongqi*, published the fullest exposition of their policy to date. In an effort to explain why Peking, which had always treated the United States as the primary enemy of China, was moving to a rapprochement with the Western capitalists, the article stressed the critical situation in which China found itself internationally and compared it to its situation during World War II. In the latter case, said the article, Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung had agreed to unite with any group (even anti-communists) in order to oppose the primary enemy--Japan. Today, the article declared, China must again distinguish between "the primary enemy and the secondary enemy." Thus, China would ally itself with the secondary enemy--the United States--in order to oppose the primary enemy--the Soviet Union. ²⁵

would form a "united front" with the enemies of its enemy, the Soviet Union.

On February 14, 1979, three days before departing on his trip to the

People's Republic of China, President Nixon ordered a further loosening of U.S. trade policy toward Peking.

The decision placed China under the same trade restrictions (labeled Group Y) as the Soviet Union and most of the Soviet bloc. China had previously been classified a Group Z country, with which no U.S. trade was allowed. Other Group Z countries included North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba.

In addition, the president decided to modify remaining Foreign Assets Control Regulations pertaining to the People's Republic of China. He directed removal of the requirement that U.S.-controlled firms in countries (including Western Europe, Canada and Japan) which were members of COCOM--the International Coordinating Committee on Strategic Trade with Communist Countries--obtain a Treasury license in addition to a host country license for the export of strategic goods to the People's Republic of China. He also directed the elimination of the

president met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung--an indication of the importance the Chinese leadership assigned Nixon's visit.

The hour long Nixon-Mao meeting took place at Mao's residence somewhere in the old Forbidden City and was described afterwards only as "frank and serious." The president was accompanied by Kissinger. Mao was accompanied by Premier Chou and by his deputy director of protocol and an interpreter.

At a banquet that evening in the Great Hall of the People, Chou offered a toast to the Nixon party, including Mrs. Nixon, in which he said that the visit was a "positive move." President Nixon responded by noting that "more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other occasion in the whole history of the world." Nixon was referring to television coverage, beamed to the world via communication satellites.²⁸

The next day, Nixon and Chou met for four hours of policy discussions. Accompanying the president were Kissinger and John H. Holdridge and Winston Lord of the National Security Council. Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei held a separate conference. Nixon and Chou met again for talks each day of his visit. Nixon spoke informally to reporters for the first time during his visit while on an excursion to the Great Wall of China. "As we look at this wall, we do not want walls of any kind between peoples," the president said. On the last day of his visit, in the Great Hall of the People, Nixon gave a banquet

²⁷ Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 580

²⁸ Chou En-lai, Nixon's toasts were exchanged in Peking, Feb. 21, 1972. See attached document, p. 111

for Chou at which the president remarked that the two countries had "begun the long process of removing that wall between us." Chou noted that "whatever zigzags and reverses there will be in the development of history, the general trend of the world is definitely toward light and not darkness."

The Nixons then journeyed to Hangzhou and in the company of Chou En-lai, to Shanghai. A joint communique was released indicating that their talks had resulted in agreement on the need for increased Sino-U.S. contacts and for eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan. The 1,800 word communique, concluded after several nights of intensive negotiations, stated that progress toward "the normalization of relations" between the two sides was "in the interests of all countries."²⁹

Henry Kissinger held a news conference in Shanghai on aspects of the communique. Asked what features of it indicated significant steps by China since its 1971 invitation to the U.S. table tennis team, Kissinger replied: "The formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two governments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two governments, the establishment of a diplomatic mechanism for continued contact, the joint statement of some general principles of international relations, the joint statement of some basic approaches to the view of the world with respect to, for instance, the section which includes the reference to hegemony--these, I believe, are matters that most of us would have considered unthinkable at the time of the invitation to the Ping-Pong team."

²⁹ The joint US-China communique issued at Shanghai, Feb.28.1972, at the conclusion of President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China. See attached document, p. 116

On their return, February 28, 1972, President and Mrs. Nixon were greeted by crowds and a military band at Andrews Air Force base in Maryland. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew welcomed Nixon and remarked, "We feel easier tonight because of the trip you took." In a nationally televised address to the crowd, the president declared: "We did not bring back any written or unwritten agreements that will guarantee peace in our time."³⁰

After his trip to Peking, Feb. 21 - 28, 1972, he was met by a rising chorus of praise for establishing contacts with the Chinese government.

The praise was not unanimous, however. Nixon's argument that Taiwan was a part of China and that its future was a matter to be determined by the Chinese, evoked bitter criticism from some sources. The statement was interpreted by some conservatives as meaning the abandonment of the Nationalist Chinese Government. Criticism came from such disparate candidates for president as Rep. John M. Ashbrook.

R-Ohio. Ashbrook said:

"For over two decades, it is we who have fostered and supported, both by words and deeds, the concept of an independent Republic of China on Taiwan. Now, in a single week, we have abandoned that position, and in so doing we have set up the framework to abandon 15 million people to the tender mercies of a regime that during its tenure in office. Its 23 years of enlightenment and progress, has managed to slay, at a conservative estimate, 34 million of its own citizens."³¹

³⁰ Nixon on China Talks, excerpts from President Nixon's remarks made at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., on his return from Peking. See attached document, p. 119

³¹ DuPre Jones, China-US Policy since 1945. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 38,39

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, D - Minn., said:

"It is now clear that the rug has been pulled out from under the Taiwanese, though the people of the island of Formosa (Taiwan) once aspired to determine their own destiny." ³²

During Nixon's visit, the U.S. officials arranged for high level

visits to China by Congressional leaders. Senate Majority Leader Mike

Mansfield (D-Mont.), and Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R -Pa.), visited six Chinese cities from April 19 to May 3, 1972, and House Majority Leader Hale Boggs (D- La.), and Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R -Mich.), followed June 23 - July 8, 1972.

Other 1972 Developments Despite Nixon's assurances that no secret deals had been made in Peking, some of the closest allies of the United States feared that the Nixon visit might presage a U.S. withdrawal from Asia. Marshall Green, the Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, was sent on a tour of reassurance early in March. Green met with leaders in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

On March 13, 1972, the U.S. and Chinese ambassadors to France met in the Chinese Embassy in Paris for the first of a series of private

the Paris meetings would be "far broader than anything ever taken up in Geneva or Warsaw," where previous Sino-U.S. ambassadorial contacts had taken place.

Returning from his May visit to the Soviet Union, President Nixon on June 1, 1972, told a joint session of Congress that his trips to Peking and Moscow were "part of a great national journey for peace" and were a move away from "perpetual confrontation" and toward "better understanding, mutual respect, point-by-point settlement of differences."

On June 19, 1972, Kissinger arrived in Peking and held four hours of talks with Premier Chou En-lai. Another four hours of discussions on the Indochina war took place June 20, 1972, between Kissinger and Chou, with Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and other officials in attendance. After four days of meetings, an official joint statement was issued simultaneously in Washington and Peking June 24, 1972. It stated that the Kissinger-Chou meetings "consisted of concrete consultations to promote the normalization of relations between the two countries."

On July 30, 1972, the Associated Press and Xinhua, the official Chinese press agency, agreed to an exchange of news and photographs. It was the first regular news contact with mainland China for a U.S. organization since December, 1949, when the last Associated Press correspondent left the country. Late in 1972, a group of American newspaper editors under the auspices of the American Society of Newspaper Editors visited China.

1973 Developments A major barrier to improved U.S.-Chinese relations was removed early in 1973 when Chinese authorities released a CIA agent

shot down over China in 1952 as well as two U.S. airmen imprisoned after

being shot down during missions in the Indochina war.

The White House announced on March 9 that the last three Americans held prisoner in China would be set free, one of them at the

personal request of President Nixon to Premier Chen En-lai. Chen


promised to commute the sentence of John T. Downen, the CIA agent, and

relations" with China. He said the United States should end its diplomatic recognition of the Nationalist government on Taiwan and announce a unilateral guarantee for Taiwan's security.

On March 15, 1973, President Nixon announced at a news conference that he had selected Ambassador David K. E. Bruce to head the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking. Bruce, 75, was called from

retirement after exercising diplomatic functions under four presidents. Nixon said he chose Bruce "because I thought it was very important to appoint a man of great stature to this position." The president said the liaison office would be opened about May 1, 1973, and would be staffed by 20 persons, including Alfred Jenkins of the State Department and John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council.

Bruce arrived in Peking May 15, 1973, officially opening the U.S. Liaison Office. On May 29, 1973, the chief of the Chinese liaison mission, Huang Zhem, arrived in Washington to resume official contact with the United States after what he called a "20-year detour."³⁵



With Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal watching, diplomatic personnel lower flag that had flown over the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking and replace it with a new banner, at ceremony marking the beginning of full diplomatic relations with the PRC, March 1, 1979.

Source : Adapted from China U.S. Policy since 1945 , (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 1980), p.243.

CHAPTER II

BASIC FOUNDATIONS OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The current Sino-American relationship exists, as far as both sides are concerned, not because the two nations love each other, but because they need it. This need is real and necessarily permanent. How and why did this relationship arise, and what is its future? Research to these

questions will expose some vitally important controversies which almost all politicians and scholars study as a basis for Sino-American relations.

1. A new multipolar balance.

Increased understanding of the realities of China's situation has been a major factor leading to a reexamination of the U.S. policy toward China. For several years, a new configuration of power has been

East Asia, like much of the world, was dominated by the atmosphere of the cold war. In the bipolar confrontation between the communist and non-communist powers, each side feared domination by the other. The bipolar balance seemed to endanger stability and threaten the peace. This situation started to change when the Sino-Soviet relationship broke down and undermined the unity of the communist bloc and the communist world movement. Both communist and non-communist nations adjusted to the new situation.³⁸

By the end of the 1960's, China acquired an independent nuclear capacity, and Sino-Soviet border clashes posed the danger of actual war between the two major communist powers.³⁹ These events destroyed the Chinese Soviet alliance. Today, China and the Soviet Union find themselves in basic conflict and compete against each other throughout most of Asia and elsewhere.⁴⁰ Bipolarity eventually changed into multipolarity and U.S.- Japanese relations experienced major adjustment at the same time.⁴¹

In response to this situation, the Nixon doctrine emerged and the U.S. has moved to reduce its military role in East Asia. ⁴² The new U.S.

³⁸ A. Doak Barnett, China and Major Powers in East Asia. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 32

³⁹ Leo Yueh-Yun Lin, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1972), p. 33

⁴⁰ A. Doak Barnett, A New U.S. Policy toward China. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971.), p. 32

⁴¹ Alan Wolfe, America's Impasse. The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth. (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 259.

⁴² Henry Kissinger, "Mr Schultz goes to China". Washington Post.

trend pushed Japan to reemerge as a major influence on Asia in politics and economics. In a sense, therefore, the pattern of big power relations in East Asia in the 1970's became a quadrilateral one, different in fundamental respects from the pattern of the past. Each of the four powers will work toward some changes. The Soviets will probably try to expand their relations with Japan and other Asian nations, competing against both Chinese and U.S. influences.

The Sino-U.S. relationship could alleviate problems elsewhere in East Asia and provide a restraining counterweight to the Soviets in the Asian area. Nixon apparently wanted to have relations with China because he expected to reduce the U.S. military presence, lower U.S. profile in East Asia, and gradually disengage the U.S. combat forces from Southeast Asia, including a re-appraisal of its military bases in this area.⁴³

Therefore, the rift between China and the Soviet Union, the emergence of China as an atomic power, the heavy burdens of the U.S. in the Indochinese war, the costly policy of confrontation and containment between East and West and the danger of nuclear war have all been basic motives in the improvement of relations with China.

Multipolarization of the world is also favorably justified by the expectation to minimize conflicts and confrontation between the two super powers which might lead to a disastrous nuclear war. Political scientists have pointed out that conflicts among three or more states are sometimes

⁴³ A. Doak Barnett, A New U.S. Policy toward China, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 32; Richard M. Nixon, "America and China: The next ten years", New York Times, Oct.11,1982, p. A19

more tractable than a direct conflict between only two parties, since diplomatic solutions can take a long time as they pass through the process of negotiation toward orderly change. The multipolar approach to dealing

As far as Asia and the Pacific were concerned, to carry out the policy of containment toward China, the U.S. had to spend over 80 billion dollars from 1945-1978.⁴⁷

In the past, the U.S. was an umbrella for the whole world against nuclear war. American armed forces were present everywhere on continents as well as oceans from Europe to Asia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The U.S. assisted these countries militarily and supported other nations economically in order to fulfil its leadership. We would say that where there was conflict, there was American involvement. Only the degree of involvement was different. "The sun never sets on the U.S. armed forces... 374 major military bases in 21 countries, America shows (its) flag. The U.S. keeps 526,000 men and women - approximately one fourth of its armed forces - on active duty abroad."⁴⁸

Now at the threshold of the 21st century, the golden days have passed. Europe has overcome most of its difficulties and restored its strength after the destruction of the two world wars.⁴⁹ The U.S. seems to have forgotten the glories of the past with its deep-rooted relationships and analogies. Europe has begun to move away from American influence and has chosen increasingly to formulate its own independent policies and

⁴⁷ Table 1. (Cost of Containment: Aid to Countries Surrounding China.), p. 36

⁴⁸ Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow. Twentieth Century America: Recent Interpretations. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 321; "End of an Era", Life, April 1988, Vol,11, Number 4 ,pp. 36,39.

⁴⁹ "The Pacific Century, Is America in decline ?" Newsweek, Feb.22, 1988, pp. 62-63; The Business Week Team, The Decline of U.S. Power (And What We Can Do about It), (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980) p. 45.

Cost of 'Containment': Aid to Countries Surrounding China

FOREIGN AID BY COUNTRY: JULY 1, 1945 - SEPT. 30, 1978

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Figures in Millions of Dollars)

U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - NET OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

	Total Military Assistance	Total Economic Assistance	Total Economic & Military Assistance	Export-Import Bank Long-Term Loans
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA				
Afghanistan	\$ 5.6	\$ 526.3	\$ 531.9	\$ 41.8
Bangladesh ¹	.3	1,312.3	1,312.6	3.3
India	145.6 ²	9,674.1	9,819.7	555.8
Nepal	2.1 ³	221.6	223.7	—
Pakistan ¹	713.2	4,880.2	5,593.4	320.0
TOTAL:	866.8	16,614.5	17,481.3	920.9
EAST ASIA				
Burma	88.7	96.8	185.5	3.4
Cambodia ⁴	1,280.3	850.9	2,131.2	—
China, Republic of	4,360.4	2,206.9 ⁵	6,567.3	1,440.3
Hong Kong	—	43.8	43.8	44.1
Indochina, Undistributed ⁴	731.5	825.6	1,557.1	—
Indonesia	369.0	2,348.0	2,717.0	603.6
Japan	1,239.7 ⁶	2,711.1	3,950.8	1,835.9
Korea, Republic of	7,275.4	5,893.9	13,169.3	2,017.6
Laos ⁴	1,606.7	900.7	2,507.4	—
Malaysia	133.5	82.5	216.0	76.5
Philippines	922.4	1,948.2	2,870.6	852.4
Ryukyu Islands ⁷	—	413.7	413.7	.5
Singapore	19.1	2.8	21.9	157.0
Thailand	1,596.4	693.5	2,289.9	121.4
Vietnam ⁴	16,416.7	6,941.3	23,360.0	—
East Asia Regional ⁸	—	337.8	337.8	—
TOTAL	36,041.8	26,297.5	62,339.3	7,152.7
OCEANIA				
Australia	115.6	8.0	123.6	945.7
New Zealand	4.3	4.3	8.6	221.6
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	—	824.2	824.2	—
TOTAL	119.9	836.5	956.4	1,167.3
GRAND TOTALS of Selected Countries	\$37,028.5	\$43,748.5	\$80,777.0	\$9,240.9

1 Aid to Bangladesh prior to 1972 included in Pakistan data

2 Began in 1961

3 Began in 1965

4 Aid to Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) before partition is shown under "Indochina, Undistributed." Aid after partition is shown under individual countries, which ended in 1975 (Aid by year, see p. 210.)

5 Includes aid to mainland China, 1945-49. Ended in 1965.

6 Excludes \$540 million of material provided from Department of Defense stocks

7 Ended in 1972 when the islands reverted to Japan

8 East Asian Regional figures include loans of the Asian Economic Development Fund, and funds for technical assistance programs

Sources: Adapted from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Washington, D.C. Agency for International Development, 1979; Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Washington, D.C. Department of Defense, 1978

Source : Adapted from China U.S. Policy since 1945 , (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 1980), p.261.

directions. America's relation with the rest of the world carry much less weight than they did before. Europe has ambitiously attempted to play its own role in the world community. "Europeans are aware of the need to play a role on the world's stage at the time when U.S. power and influence are waning."⁵⁰ Europe has been splitting with America to prove its own abilities and protect its own interests.⁵¹

The cold war also has its impact in American relations with the third world. Containing Soviet expansion renewed American efforts to increase the military power of former colonial states on or near the Soviet border. This created pressure for these newly independent states to join an anti-Soviet military alliance. "Positive neutralism" was not considered adequate by Washington for states at or near the Soviet territorial boundary lines. Of course, to the third world states, this American pressure was experienced as a threat to their independence.⁵²

There was a tendency for third world states to push for greater independence from the bi-polar rivalry. After a while the American taxpayer also became disenchanted with the limited effectiveness of "buying friends" in the third world. As time passed, new and urgent domestic issues needed attention. These to some degree crowded out the earlier concentrated attention Washington gave foreign affairs.⁵³

⁵⁰ "Toward Real Community ?", Time , April 18,1988 p. 55.

⁵¹ Patricia Ann O'Connor, Historic Documents of 1978, "New European Monetary System," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc.1979),p. 741

⁵² Alan Wolfe, America's Impasse, (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 109; Bruno S. Frey, International Political Economics, "Who Gives and Receives Foreign Aid", (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.,1984), pp. 87,168.

In such a situation, it is not surprising that the U.S. needed to advocate the world multipolarity to guarantee its own security and that of the rest of the world.

The world is changing, so it is natural that changes in the American policies must follow suit so that the U.S. role in the political and economic fields toward the world will fit the new reality before it becomes too late.⁵⁴

On the other hand, China of the 1940's was really a backward country torn to pieces by big powers. But now the modern China, with atomic power and one billion people, is a country the U.S. and the world as a whole cannot ignore or disregard. Isolating and containing a giant

country with almost inexhaustible human resources and atomic weapons is an undertaking we cannot sustain for too long a time.⁵⁵

Ultimately, the capacity and strength of a country has to control its aspirations and ambitions. The Soviet Union has closed ties to Eastern Europe, the U.S. has strong influence in Western Europe and South America. Similarly, China seeks to exercise a sphere of influence on its border.

⁵³ Robert Stone and Julene Fischer, The Vietnam Experience. Images of War, (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1986), p. 124; The Business Week Team, The Decline of U.S. Power (And What We Can Do about It), (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980) p. 145.

⁵⁴ Herb Addo, Transforming the World Economy? (London: Hodder

That is the reason why President Nixon declared his intention "...to create a balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake..."⁵⁶ So, establishing diplomatic relations with China, recognizing China's influence and being ready to share interests with it is a reasonable course of action to take if we don't want confrontation and wars.

Thus, multipolarization is a natural process in our present world. American foreign policies should not be rigid and immobile. They need to change to suit new conditions and meet the new capacities and aspirations of the American people.⁵⁷ The multipolar doctrine, one of the basic principles of the American policy toward China under the Nixon administration, should be regarded as a globally strategic decision that helps the United States prepare for new steps into the twenty-first century.

2. From Idealpolitic to Realpolitic

Anti-communism also could no longer be very useful as a means of eliciting popular support, since the U.S. might well be supporting one communist state against another. The philosophy underlying American foreign policy during the Kissinger Republican years from 1969-1977 began with the assumption that international politics was not a fight between the good side and the bad side. All states had the right to exist and possessed legitimate interests, a right as true for communist as for non-communist states. A nation, therefore, did not launch crusades against an adversary


⁵⁶ The Nixon Doctrine and China. See attached document, p.94

⁵⁷ Alan Wolfe, America's Impasse.. (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 109.

on the assumption that a difference of interests represented a conflict of virtue and evil. The better part of wisdom was to learn living with other states, also to attempt resolving differences and to build on shared interests.⁵⁸

The negotiation with a communist regime such as that of the Soviet Union was not a matter of morality which required an internal purification of preceding discussions. It was a matter of dealing with a powerful state with which the U.S. had to discuss issues if peace and security were to be preserved. No state could be completely satisfied, but it could be relatively satisfied. Detente was thus initially adopted as a strategy for managing the superpowers' adversary relationship that would seek to secure American interests at a lower level of tensions and costs than those required by the policy of cold war confrontation and frequent crises.⁵⁹

The relation between the U.S. and Peking could be used to provide the Soviet Union with an incentive to act with restraint and a greater willingness to compromise if it wished to avoid closer Sino-American relations and cooperation against the Soviet Union. On the other hand,



Sino-Soviet split and relying heavily on American technology and food as non-military "weapons." ⁶⁰

Examining the problem more deeply, we all agree that absoluteness, not only in the political field, is impossible in our complicated world where every nation, every people is a member with its completely different and sometimes contradictory conditions and situations. Conflicts and contradictions originating from interests and aspirations are realities we have to recognize. Every nation in the world has to respect the interests of others and must be willing to share common interest with them rather than pursue selfish policies of exploitation or resorting to wars to of conquest.

Peaceful coexistence and recognition of one another's rights as well as sharing common interests are characteristics of a human and civilized international society. Through three-fourths of this century, the differences in political ideologies have torn the world into pieces and have caused much suffering and death, especially for underdeveloped countries. Scarce resources of the world, instead of being used for the benefit of humanity, were wasted by military rivalry and war.⁶¹

It is high time for every nation in the world to look straight at the reality rather than relying on some dogmatic beliefs or nourishing ambitions to force other nations to live up to its own values and laws.

⁶⁰ Reihard Rode and Hanns D. Jacobsen, Economic Warfare or Detent (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), p. 185.

⁶¹ John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations go to War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 223

For the present world, truth and justice should be redefined in a more acceptable sense so that nations generally have enough political latitude to work out their own future in peaceful coexistence.

As Abba Eban once said: "An understanding of reality is beginning of wisdom." If compromise is to reduce open conflict on the battlefield, a nation's ideology must be restrained enough to allow for the legitimate national interests of other states. The world has truly become "a global village."⁶²

It is very sad to realize that for three-fourths of the century the ideological conflicts have split the world and put millions of people to death, wasted billions of dollars in arms and the arm race intended for destroying human beings and the world.

The dogmatists of these ideologies believed and acted in the name of some principles that past experience have proved impossible. Now Communism is on the way to Capitalism and capitalism is on the way to socialization.

Today the Soviet Union and China, the two countries which have advocated communism the most, are applying new policies aimed at recognizing limited private ownership in a limited number of areas. On the other hand, in the capitalist world, especially in Scandinavian countries, tax, health insurances, assistance for elderly people all have positive social character.⁶³

⁶² Abba Eban; address to the Twentieth United Nations General Assembly.

⁶³ Gunnar Heckscher. The Welfare State and Beyond. (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 53-88; "China's Roving Saleman", "China's Shift, Dramatic, Ambitious and Realistic." U.S. News & World Report, Feb.5,1979,pp. 23,43.

Thus, realpolitik should be advocated and disseminated more widely and the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China should be considered as a pioneer act aimed at correcting a disastrous mistake which has lasted far too long in the history of international relations. We can no longer continue to isolate China, a country with immense potential and a population amounting to one-fifth of mankind, from the rest of the world or participation in the life of the world community.

Political ideologies are no longer attractive labels for the next century. The world community, especially the underdeveloped countries which have grown up in suffering, surely will understand this more clearly than anybody else because they themselves were victims of political ideologies and schemes for hegemony.

Political ideologies are just a bundle of principles and orientations that need to be adjusted by reality if they want to bring about progress and benefit to human beings.

Recognizing the reality of international politics, sharing interests and recognizing one another's rights are the best solutions for mankind and the world. Normalization of diplomatic relations with China is a historic step not only for the U.S. but also for the rest of the world. It opens a new page in the history of international relations. East and West can get closer to each other. Communism and Capitalism, although contradictory in nature, also have innumerable similarities and it is most important of all to put aside the differences in order to discuss and develop common interests. Developing common interests and reducing the differences will

help, at least, to put an end to hostilities and tensions which can push all of us into extermination.⁶⁴

It is a truism that arms and wars are very expensive and therefore represent a budget burden. World military expenditures are estimated to have exceeded one trillion dollars in 1981 and are expected to rise to one trillion 600 billion dollars by the year 2000.⁶⁵ It also goes without saying that if these swords could truly be converted into plowshares, that if arms and wars dollars could be redirected into schools, hospitals, economic developments and other peaceful purposes, then the human condition would improve.

We must focus on the wellbeing of human society rather than being dogmatists or ideologists. Moreover, existing ideologies, although advocated

for a long time were not always suitable to the political and economic realities

The world has changed. Big powers have to realize this so that they

can play the role of pioneer in opening up new opportunities for mankind

the world to move on and has opened many new possibilities for progress of the world community in the last years of this century.⁶⁶

3. Detente with China

The U.S. has two detentes, one with China and one with the Soviets. Indeed, it may be argued that the detente with China is the greater one because of the high degree of hostility that has existed between the two countries since 1950. In any event, it is probably correct to argue that detente with China is a prerequisite to detente with the Soviets. The purpose of this has been increasing pressure upon Moscow to be more conciliatory on such prominent substantial issues as arms control for offensive and defensive strategic missiles.

In the Shanghai Communique released at the end of Nixon's historic visit, the U.S. and China declared their opposition to the hegemony of any power in Asia -- it was clear that the power they meant was the Soviet Union.⁶⁷

Thus, there was evidence of China's fear of the Soviet Union. Washington, in the 1950's, had feared the Sino-Soviet coalition, and Peking, during the 1960's, had frequently pointed to an alleged Soviet-American coalition in an attempt to isolate China, so Moscow then became apprehensive of closer Sino-American relations.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ John Bryan Starr, The Future of U.S.-China Relations (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 263, 264

⁶⁷ 1972 Shanghai Communique. See attached document, p. 116

⁶⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "If the Russians and the Chinese Make up", Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1982, p. A15

Thus, the possible advantages of "playing the China card" against Moscow were matched by the dangers of China's "playing the American card", and the possibility of Moscow's someday "playing its China card" against America.⁶⁹

From these observations, it is obvious that detente with China, in the point of view of strategy, is truly an effective weapon for bargaining with the Soviet Union, forcing them into a position where they will have to content with a new and powerful force, a force with nuclear potential, a manpower supply of 1 billion people and 4500 miles of common border.⁷⁰

In other words, detente with China will directly increase the defense budget to the Soviets and indirectly decrease their offensive capability toward the U.S., and the U.S. will have more advantages when the Soviets have to widely scatter their offensive, as well as defensive forces, along a global frontier in case of an all out war.

Detente with China, restoring relations with it, easing commercial restrictions and dismantling the policy of containment and isolation of China will bring China into a new strategic position and consequently wreck the existing balance of power.⁷¹ The decision to resume diplomatic

⁶⁹ Martin L. Lasater. The Taiwan Issue in Sino American Strategic Relations.(Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 77-79.

⁷⁰ "Russia vs. China Struggle for Asia".U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 5, 1979, p. 27.

⁷¹ Prepared statement of Paul Wolfowitz, "Sino-American Relations eleven years after the Shangai Communique" given before U.S. House of Representative, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Feb 18,1983, pp 1, 3, ms.

relations with China was an historic step toward rearranging the structures of the world and reevaluating the capabilities of the U.S. and other world powers.

Detente with China, applying the China card in the Soviet-American relations, can be the turning point in the American foreign policy. The new balance of international powers with the presence of China is a multilateral relationship.⁷²

The relationship between world powers is no longer the confrontation of two blocks with the possible danger of world war. We can say the balance in the past was the balance of a scale with frequent fluctuations and changes. Consequently, conflicts, tension, and wars between East and West continuously threatened to happen at any time.

Having detente with China, opening the way for China to join the world community at the same time investing some technology and resources to help it firmly advance to the status of world power, the U.S. has created a new pattern of relationships in which world security is to be guaranteed by multitudes and many concerned nations. This new relationship obligates the big powers to seek and make the effort to win support and examine every issue more carefully before starting any act of aggression or warfare.

By having detente with China, besides its immediate effect in its relations with the Soviet Union, the U.S. has opened a new route for the

⁷² U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 15

countries of the third world and created a series of new relations between China and the world. We can say without fear of exaggeration that the U.S. has rearranged international relations and global strategy, both economically and politically, through its normalization of relations with China.

Furthermore, through detente with China, the U.S. has been able to reduce the substantial expenses it had incurred in order to cope with its enemy. From being the enemy, now China has become friendly in some aspects or, at least, its hatred and hostility has been substantially reduced.

Thus, not yet mentioning the benefits of trade between the two countries, it is obvious that the U.S. has reaped very important benefits as far as defense and the security of Asia and the Pacific are concerned.⁷³ As for China, a very influential country in the area is now no longer a mortal enemy but a power with which the U.S. can negotiate and bargain on any issue. The remaining problems that the two countries have to resolve in the future are how to develop common interests and, at the same time, minimize differences, promote friendship and the cooperation that for a long time has been frozen by the impractical and erroneous conceptions of both parties.

⁷³ Prepared statement of William A. Brown, "The Soviets Role in Asia" given before U.S. House of Representative, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and on Europe and the Middle East, The Soviets Role in Asia, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), pp. 536-537

4. Sino-American trade.

relations has come from the business community, which is eager to open the huge China market to American goods. In the statement of Professor Alexander Eckstein, testifying before the Joint Economic Committee on Dec.9,1970 : "It is time to lift the embargoes against China pure and simple. It is an anachronism, a monument to bureaucratic rigidity and a symbol of a hard-line China policy that we have been pursuing for the last

Chinese exports to the U.S. grew steadily, reaching \$203 million in 1977, but they remained a small fraction of China's total exports of \$8 billion. Imports to the U.S. consisted largely of textiles and apparel, antiques and handicrafts, bristles and feathers, fireworks and non-ferrous metals. U.S. exports to China fluctuated wildly, largely in response to Chinese demands for agricultural commodities such as wheat and soybeans. Large food shipments in 1974 boosted U.S. exports to \$807 million. China, in this period, also bought 10 Boeing aircrafts, 8 ammonia plants and substantial amounts of equipment for the exploration and drilling of oil.⁷⁶

In 1978, trade between the two nations was more than doubled, to more than \$1 billion. By 1979, the U.S. ranked third as a major supplier of goods to the PRC (behind Japan and West Germany), and third as a major market for PRC exports (behind Hongkong and Japan).⁷⁷

Besides the trade faction between U.S. and the PRC as mentioned above, the National Council for U.S.-China Trade estimated that Peking

would spend \$40 billion on foreign capital investments between 1979-1985

while Commerce Department experts estimated spending in the \$60 billion to \$80 billion range. The two way trade between the U.S. and China was expected to continue upwards in the 1980's and the U.S. firms involved in areas such as mining, energy, steel and hydroelectric facilities were

Throughout the Sino-American trade and China's trade potential, we have to agree that the normalized relations between the U.S and China and the U.S policy toward China under Nixon's presidency was a practical action, not only for the U.S. but also for the international economy. ⁷⁹

It is obviously not to be limited to the East Asian region; it takes into account varied global problems. It attempts to resolve differences and build on shared interests, opens the door for other nations to the huge China market, develops trade for all, and eventually, the world market no longer suffers from the ideologic differences. Communism and Capitalism both have the right to exist and possess legitimate interests, to learn to live together and to build up the common wealth for all.

Frank and more clear cut was Vice President Walter Mondale's address to the Chinese people in Peking, Aug. 27, 1979:

"In trade, our interests are served by your expanding exports of

natural resources and industrial products-and at the same time your interests are served by the purchases you can finance through those exports. As you industrialize, you provide a higher standard of living for your people. And at the same time our interests are served--for this will increase the flow of trade, narrow the wealth gap between the developed and developing world, and thus help alleviate a major source of global instability."⁸⁰


War and enmity are always death and the abyss for people, not only for Capitalism but also for Communism. Decreasing tensions between

⁷⁹ Nixon Trade Speech, given by President Nixon in Kansas City, July 6, 1971. See attached document, p. 106; John Bryan Starr, The Future of U.S.-China Relations. (New York: New York University Press, 1981) p. 49

⁸⁰ DuPre Jones, China-U.S. Policy since 1945. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 62

Highlights of U.S.-China Trade

Millions of U.S. Dollars



SOURCE: U.S. Commerce Dept.

Source : Adapted from China-U.S. Policy since 1945 , (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 1980), p. 66.

U.S.-China Trade by Commodity, 1972-78

(in millions of U.S. dollars)


	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979*
U.S. exports	63	740	819	304	135	171	864	395
Agricultural commodities:	61	628	668	80	0	64	573	—
Wheat	35	308	234	0	0	0	250	—
Corn	24	141	96	0	0	0	118	—
Soybeans	0	55	138	0	0	0	15	—
Cotton	0	101	186	80	0	18	157	—
Vegetable oils	2	19	8	0	0	28	26	—
Metals:	0	31	22	83	47	7	—	—
Steel scrap	0	24	12	13	4	Negl.	—	—
Aluminum	0	3	0	47	26	5	0	—
Iron and steel pipe	0	0	3	12	11	Negl.	—	—
Machinery and equipment:	2	69	107	121	57	56	93	—
Aircraft, including engines, parts and accessories	0	63	76	2	1	Negl.	Negl.	—
Other	0	12	22	22	23	48	—	—
U.S. imports	32	64	115	158	201	203	324	101
Foodstuffs and tobacco	4	7	16	16	24	26	—	—
Textiles and apparel	7	15	36	45	63	58	—	—
Silk and other fibers	4	6	5	4	8	8	—	—
Cotton and other fabrics	2	7	25	31	35	21	—	—
Clothing and footwear	1	2	6	10	20	29	—	—
Handicrafts:	8	15	20	22	42	49	—	—
Antiques, works of art	3	6	8	6	12	9	—	—
Bristles, downs and feathers	8	8	10	6	23	28	—	—
Chemicals, including fireworks	2	8	18	18	18	22	—	—
Nonferrous minerals and metals:	2	8	11	42	21	12	—	—
Tin	1	8	9	40	13	4	—	—
Other	1	3	4	11	10	8	—	—

* 1st quarter only.

Source: U.S. Commerce Department

Source : Adapted from China-U.S. Policy since 1945 , (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly 1980), p. 70.

China: Geographic Distribution of Trade, 1978



Source : Adapted from China-U.S. Policy since 1945 , (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 1980), p. 67.

CHAPTER III

THE TAIWAN ISSUE

From the outset of discussions aimed at normalization of the U.S. and the People's Republic of China relations, it was clear that Taiwan would be an issue over which little agreement could be found.⁸¹ Nonetheless, by the time President Nixon made his historic trip to China in Feb. 1972, the PRC had decided to make Taiwan a secondary issue and to concentrate instead on the large strategic interests of the two countries.

Henry Kissinger recorded that, during Nixon's visit, Mao...

delicately placed the issue of Taiwan on a subsidiary level choosing to treat it as a relatively minor internal Chinese dispute, he did not mention our military presence there- - - Neither then, nor in any subsequent meeting, did Mao indicate any impatience over Taiwan, set any time limits, make any threats, or treat it as the touchstone of our relationship. "We can do without them for the time being, and let it come after 100 Years". "Why such great haste?". This issue is not an important one, the issue of the international situation is an important one. The small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world. These were Mao's thoughts on Taiwan as expressed to us on many visits.⁸²

⁸¹ Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 571

⁸² Henry A. Kissinger. White House Years. (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1979), p. 1062.

And more precisely as Chou En-lai told president Nixon just prior to his departure from China on Feb. 28, 1972 :

"We, being so big, have already let the Taiwan issue remain for twenty-two years, and can afford to let it wait there for a time."⁸³

In the Shanghai Communique of Feb. 28, 1972, regarding Taiwan, the two sides set forth their individual views which continue to guide their respective policies today.⁸⁴

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position -- the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the U.S; the government of the Peoples' Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments" or advocates that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared-- the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China


⁸³ Henry A. Kissinger. White House Years. (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1979), p. 1087.

⁸⁴ 1972 Shanghai Communique. See attached document, pp. 116,117

and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interests in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.⁸⁵

Under Nixon's presidency, the Taiwan issue was the most complicated and difficult problem for American policy makers concerned with China. The new U.S. policy would, by no means, fully resolve the dilemma.⁸⁶

The U.S. would make clear its desire and determination to adjust policy to reality. We have demonstrated our willingness to compromise, but



we also have indicated the limits of compromise from the U.S. point view. The key question will then be whether, in time, Peking will also see the necessity and desirability of compromise on major issues in the interests of mutual accommodation. There is a basis for hoping that it will do so eventually, even though it is impossible to predict precisely when or how.

But we must clearly recognize that there are limits to compromise from Peking's viewpoint as well as our own. In regard to Taiwan, in

particular, we can not expect Peking to abandon its basic claims, at least in the foreseeable future. As for the problem of Taiwan's long run future , the prime requisite for any solution is time. With the deaths of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, as well as social, economic, and political changes in both mainland China and Taiwan, there will be a mainframe for the Taiwan solution. Whether Taiwan will eventually become a viable independent state accepted as such by Peking, or will be fully reincorporated into China in a way acceptable to the Taiwanese, or will be reassociated with the mainland while retaining some degree of autonomy such as Hongkong, in the future, through agreements between China and England remains to be seen.

We would say, in the basic sense, therefore, that the Taiwan problem is and must be a question for the future because there is no simple way of

solving it in any final sense today.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Through improving diplomatic relations with China under the Nixon administration, and the reasons mentioned to justify this historical action, we can compile a list of its impacts as well as its influence on the political and economic policies of the United States, China and the rest of the world.

1.The political aspect.

The era of negotiation and reconciliation.

We can assert that the normalization of diplomatic relations with China is one of the hallmarks of President Nixon's political career.

Early in October 1970, Nixon gave an interview to Time magazine and said: "If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don't, I want my children to." ⁸⁷ With the authority of the presidency he had, step by step, reestablished diplomatic contacts with China, overcoming over twenty years of coldness and creating a new era with drastic changes in international relations.

⁸⁷ Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.546

In Nixon's First Inaugural Address, he said: "After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation...Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open...We seek an open world -- open to ideas, open to the exchanges of goods and people, a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation. We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy." ⁸⁸

Thus the normalization of diplomatic relations with China is an official declaration that American foreign policies have changed in direction. Confronting and isolating Communist countries no longer fits the present international conditions and is no longer favorable to American interests. The era of cooperation and negotiation was indeed realized with the Nixon administration's normalization of diplomatic relations with China.

The danger and the cost that the U.S. had to pay for its defense in the past, along with the changes in conditions in the United States and the world, are typical motivations of the new political tendencies.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Nixon's First Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1969. See attached document, p.105

⁸⁹ Du Pre Jones, China-U.S. Policy since 1945 (Cost of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam: 1960-1975; Economic and Military Aid to Indochina: 1953-1980) (Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly, 1980) pp.217, 230; Robert Stone and Julene Fisher, The Vietnam Experience, (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1986) p. 124; The Business Week Team, The Decline of U.S. Power and What We Can Do About It. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980) p.145; Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matson, Twentieth-Century America: Recent Interpretations (New York: Karcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1972), pp. 472,491.

With costly experiences, the world powers at last began to realize that world peace cannot be achieved through the victory of one side over the other but only through the development of relationships and cooperation and the reduction of differences between the nations.

Also in the First Inaugural Address, Nixon said : "The peace we seek -- the peace we seek to win -- is not victory over any other people, but the peace that comes with healing in its wings, with compassion for those who have suffered; with understanding for those who have opposed us; with opportunity for all the people of this earth to choose their own destiny." ⁹⁰

Thus, world peace is not the struggle for survival but the sharing of common interests, mutual concessions and compromises in every dispute. Military victory at the present time means nuclear victory and it also means that all belligerent parties involved will surely be destroyed. Negotiation, reconciliation, cooperation and the sharing of common interests have been used as effective solutions for the present world crisis.

Recognition of political reality.


On the other hand, recognizing China is recognizing a reality, a nation of one billion people with its nuclear power and its big economic potential. And recognizing Taiwan as a sole and legal representative of China in the international forum is a politically out-of-date act. The

⁹⁰ Nixon's First Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1969. See attached document, p.103

United Nations, an international platform in which a billion people, or one-fifth of mankind, have no voice, no right to express their opinion on international affairs is really a deficiency, a contradiction to the name of the organization. It hampers the United Nation from working effectively.

In Kansas city, July 6, 1971, Nixon said : " But Mainland China, outside the world community, completely isolated, with its leaders not in communication with other world leaders, would be a danger to the whole world that would be unacceptable, unacceptable to us and unacceptable to others as well." ⁹¹

Furthermore, by ending the isolation of China, the most populous country in the world, the United States has activated its superiority in capital and technology to open the way for China to get out of its one-way thinking and out of its fanaticism in ideology and has provided Chinese youth with the opportunity to compare the merits and advantages of different political and the freedom associated with each system. ⁹²



exchange in the normalization of their relation with China, the United States is pushing China into a position to accept the international order and reduce hostilities and animosities. If we want to establish cooperation in an international organization, we have to accept, willingly or unwillingly, a number of set regulations and laws which are the basis of every collective life. By admitting China into the United Nations and providing her the opportunity to assume her responsibilities and enjoy her interests in the world community, China can be made to accept a number of changes in international society, resume cultural and economic exchanges with other nations and have the chance to develop. It is these motivations that will help attract her out of her isolation, extremism and rigid ideology.

Through reestablishing diplomatic relations with China, and recognizing China as a political reality, the United States has acknowledged her political influence and role in international affairs. With a new position in the world community, with new hope and new needs, China has to readjust herself to catch up in all respects with other nations in the world. China also has to change her policies in order to create international cooperation and to promote common welfare.⁹³

⁹³ Leo Yueh - Yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 73-89; "China Power Game", Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1988 Year Book, pp. 13, 14 "China's changing of the guard", Newsweek, Nov. 16, 1987, p. 78; "Tempest in a teacup", Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1989. "Avoiding the issues" Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 April 1989; "Let a Hundred Lilies Bloom", Newsweek, April 10 1989. p.59

Accepting ideological differences in international relations.

Through normalization of relations with China, the United States' policies have undergone important modifications. The differences in beliefs are no longer a reason to demolish relations between East and West or to destroy each other. The United States can accept the differences in political doctrines as a political reality of a multifaceted

world.

By recognizing China with full membership in the United Nations and agreeing to peacefully coexist with a nation of one billion people, the United States has minimized the ideological differences in international relations. But since Communism and Capitalism have a large ground of common interests, they can mutually acknowledge their differences and strive to develop their common interests.

In a toast to Chou En-lai, Nixon said:

"... we have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests that transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it ..." ⁹⁴

This normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China is an act designed to reduce the ideological disputes. In other words, struggles caused by the differences in ideologies are now out

of date. Confrontation, containment and restrictions have proved to be damaging and ineffective. Now it is the era of negotiation, cooperation and benefit sharing.

Ideologies seem to be fading away. The main concern of mankind is now economic matters, the satisfaction of human needs and the comfort of daily life.⁹⁵ Military measures have given way to economic cooperation which will bind different nations in mutually benefiting agreements and accords and will reduce international tensions and the danger of war.

The balance of multilateral military and political power

Reestablishing relations with China indirectly recognizes China as a nuclear power, at least in Asia. The nuclear capacity of China is entering the stage of rapid development. Thus, in Asia, besides the United States and the Soviet Union, China with its geographical location and its population, its military and economic strengths, must be recognized as an influential power in the process of stabilization of this region. Without China there will be no solution to any problem in Asia and the Pacific. In other words, recognizing the participation of China in the

⁹⁵ "The cracks within", Time, Nov.28, 1988, pp. 46-48; "Holding most of the cards", Time, May 23, 1988, p.28; "A Brave Turnaround?", Newsweek, Sept. 5, 1988, pp. 40,43. "Korea: Economic relations", Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb.16,1989,p. 43; "Perestroika to Pizza", Time, May 2, 1988, pp.52,53;"The Pas de Perestrioka",Newsweek, Dec.14, 1987. p.43; "Mitterand names new prime minister", San Jose Mercury News, May 11, 1988, p.10A; "Chinese, Reassessing the Legacy of Mao", San Francisco Chronicle, Feb.8, 1989, p. A15; "The New U.S.S.R.", Time, April 10,1989. pp.46-129; "Chip Off the Old Bloc", Time, March 27,1989, pp46-52; "Moscow Scale Back", Time, April17,1989, pp.32-34; "A New Style of Socialism ?", Newsweek, April 10,1989, pp.36,37; "And Now It's Goeorge's Turn", Newsweek, April 17,1989, pp.30-32.

military and political stabilization of Asia is the acknowledgement of a reality as President Nixon said : " It is a truism that an international order cannot be secured if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile toward it." ⁹⁶

He added : " I wish to make it clear that the U.S. is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations."

With the new role of China in Asia, there are now four powers in the region -- the U.S., the Soviet Union, China and Japan. The bipolar confrontation has now disappeared. The bilateral balance of power has ceased to exist and given way to a multilateral balance in which the Southeast Asian nations are one member. The diminution of influence of both the United States and the Soviet Union is now complemented by the emergence of new powers like Japan and China. This has resulted in bringing China into the balance of power in the Pacific, a balance which includes economic, political, and military factors. ⁹⁷

⁹⁶ The Nixon Doctrine and China - President Nixon's second annual State of the World Report, delivered Feb. 25, 1971. See attached document, p.91

⁹⁷ A. Doak Barnett, A New U.S. Policy toward China. (Washington, D.C.;The Brookings Institution, 1971) pp. 34-51; Gene T. Hsiao, Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications. (New York:

In his address following his visit to China, President Nixon stated : " We agreed that we are opposed to domination of the Pacific area by any one power ..." ⁹⁸

The U.S. and China are opposed to any hegemony in the region, an allusion to the Soviet Union. The balance of power in the region is based on agreements and mutual concessions of the parties concerned. No one power can dominate and impose its own policies on the region.

The stability of the region is based on accords and negotiations between conflicting parties. The bilateral confrontation between Capitalism and Communism in this region is really fading away and the small nations of Asia are experiencing a new opportunity. With these important changes and with the changing tendency of the world in general, Asia is moving rapidly to modernize its society, a society which has experienced a great deal of Western colonial influence, from the Opium War until after World War II. ⁹⁹

With regard to military and political stability, the multilateral balance of power enables Asian nations to avoid disputes in ideologies, and to neutralize the conflicts in interests and influence of big powers, to

⁹⁸ Nixon on China talks, President Nixon's remarks made at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. on his return from Peking, Feb. 28, 1972. See attached document, p.120

⁹⁹ "Yen power goes global", Time, August 8, 1988, pp. 26-29; "Japan challenges America's reputation for creativity and innovation", Time, March 21, 1988, pp. 50,51; "Asia's new economic tiger", Newsweek July 11, 1988, p.52; "The Pacific Century", Newsweek, Feb.22, 1988, pp. 43-47.

enhance their economic, cultural and political relations. The previous United States policy of containment in the Far East immediately after World War II negated the possibilities of the peaceful settlement of conflicts of interests in the area. Now, the settlement of national conflicts among countries of Indochina has been facilitated by diplomatic concessions among China, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Thus, by restoring diplomatic relations with China and recognizing China as a big power in Asia, the United States has both acknowledged the existing reality and has created a more stable political climate among the nations of the region. Furthermore, the United States has been successful in reducing violent conflicts such as the earlier Vietnam and Korean wars. On the other hand, the United States can save major expenses in defense and in military aid to the nations in the region. The presence of the United States is now only a nuclear umbrella for Asia. Military commitments between the United States, Japan, Korea and Taiwan is decreasing thanks to the noticeable diminution of military pressure. The United States is now in a better position to implement new policies in the Far East, policies more conducive to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and more in keeping with the political realities of the region.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ "Bush arrives in Japan, eyes strong Pacific ties", The Argus, Feb. 23, 1989, pp.1,10;; "Bush lands in Japan reveals his Asian plans", San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 23, 1989, pp. A1, A18.

Exploitation of the divisions between the Soviet Union and China and the reduction of military expenses and the burden of defense for the U.S. and the free world.

Reestablishing relations with China not only has had great impact on the U.S. and China but also on the whole world with regard to strategy. It alters the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, between the Capitalist and the Soviet blocs and at the same time restructures the relationships between nations in the world by basing policy on a multilateral balance and the sharing of economic interests.

The participation of China in international life actually aggravates the division in the already split Communist bloc, deepens the disputes among Communist countries and weakens the unity and strength of the Communist world.¹⁰¹

With its resources in population size, its large territory (about one-fifth of Asia) and its nuclear capacity and economic potentialities, China is strengthening its ambition to lead the third world by attracting other Communist countries out of the Soviet orbit and confronting the Soviet Union whenever the struggle for influence exists.

On the Nixon Doctrine and China, President Nixon remarked :
"The Stalinist bloc has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine and

¹⁰¹ Gene T. Hsiao, Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 23-25; "Russia vs. China-Struggle for Asia", U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 5, 1979, pp. 27, 28.

power. One of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union." ¹⁰² So, it is obvious that by normalizing diplomatic relations with China, the U.S. has divided the international Communist bloc. By using the Communists to fight against the Communists, helping China to strengthen its own forces in order to confront the Soviet Union not only ideologically but also militarily and economically, the United States has more advantages in bargaining with the Soviet Union to solve other international issues like arms reduction, disarmament and detente in areas where the Soviet Union and the U.S. have dispute. The net result is that the U.S. can save its expenses in defense and reduce its military aid to its allies in their struggles against Communist expansion as well as minimize and even eliminate local conflicts everywhere in the world.

In past decades, especially in Asia, wars have arisen from ideological differences. The Soviet Union and China both supported these ideological conflicts against the U.S. and the free world. Now everything has changed. The United States shares many common interests with China. Both nations working together push the Soviet Union into a

For nations of the third world, Communism, as developed and practiced in the Soviet Union and China, is no longer an attraction. Due to selfish exploitation of the Soviet Union and China and the setback of Communism after three quarters of a century in practice, the underdeveloped countries are now finding for themselves another way suitable to their special situations.¹⁰³

We can therefore say that the U.S. has used its eminence and diplomatic influence to push China into the position of world leader as President Nixon asserted : "The People's Republic of China is making a claim to leadership in the less developed portions of the world ..." ¹⁰⁴

By recognizing China as a leader in Asia, the U.S. has divided the strength of the Communist bloc and enabled China to struggle against the Soviet Union for power and influence. Thanks to these struggles inside the Communist bloc, the United States has gained time to rearrange international relationships suitable to its own interest and the aspirations of its allies. Nevertheless, U.S leadership will probably be important for the foreseeable future.

¹⁰³ "Bracing for Trouble", Newsweek, Nov. 30, 1987, p.38
 "Taiwan's door opens wider to China", Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 Dec. 1988, p. 8; "Fraternal Differences", Time, July 25, 1988, p. 38

¹⁰⁴ The Nixon Doctrine and China, President Nixon's second annual State of the World Report, delivered Feb. 25, 1971. See attached document, p.90

Exploiting economic, cultural and technological superiorities to support military and political progress.

With time, we all realize that the absolute superiority in nuclear power of the United States not only no longer prevails but has also relatively decreased, not because of lack of innovations but due to the nature of the matter and the increasing improvements in nuclear techniques of other nuclear powers.¹⁰⁵

Today, nuclear war between superpowers would result in total destruction for mankind. It is a war without victors. All parties involved in the hostility, all parties using nuclear weapons would have to endure the terrible destruction and the holocaust of the war. Therefore, the nuclear balance in the world is itself a restraint on the policy of nuclear powers to use the weapons. At the same time it is a warning for leaders of the superpowers to consider the consequences carefully before they decide to use atomic weapons against their foes. The balance of nuclear power is therefore a kind of political balance aimed at avoiding war and keeping world peace. The devastation of atomic weapons is so destructive that it becomes an absolute self-restraint, because using it means destruction for the enemy and also destruction for the wielders themselves.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Leo Yueh - Yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), pp 83-86; "A rendezvous in Washington", Newsweek, Nov. 30, 1987, pp.26-29; "Can Europe stand on its own feet", Newsweek, Dec. 7, 1987, pp. 31,32, 37.

¹⁰⁶ David W. Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981), p. 231.

For other countries, the technical capacity to experiment, produce and improve nuclear weapons is increasing. Hence the U.S. is gradually losing its superiority in the nuclear race. In today's world, it is difficult for a superpower to find a usable form of nuclear power to achieve political purposes including the realization of its national interest. Thus, President Nixon's policy of de-emphasizing ideological differences with China and emphasizing common interests resulted in a major improvement of the U.S. position in Far Eastern international relations. By expanding the era of negotiation, reconciliation, and cooperation, the U.S. wanted to increase its influence to promote new political orders in this region.

2.The economic aspect.

According to the Shanghai Communique, along with agreements in the political field, the United States and China also discussed the problems of trade as well as cultural, educational and technological exchanges.¹⁰⁷ The two nations have a different ideology and a difference in political systems, but besides these grounds they have an amazing similarity in economic matters. This is the reason why the two nations have reestablished their diplomatic relations after twenty years of interruption and animosity.

¹⁰⁷ 1972 Shanghai Communique was issued at Shanghai, Feb.27, 1972, at the conclusion of President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China. See attached document, pp.117, 118

In Nixon's Trade Speech, he said :

" ... and I have seen them all over the world, and some of you have, too, whether in Hong Kong, or whether in Taiwan, or whether they are in Singapore or Bangkok, any of the great cities, Manila, where Chinese are there -- they are creative, they are productive, they are one of the capable people in the world. And 800 million Chinese are going to be, inevitably, an enormous economic power ... that is the reason why I felt that it was essential that this administration take the first steps toward ending the isolation of Mainland China from the world community ." ¹⁰⁸

He also reminded us with his prediction that China will become an economic power by the end of this century or in the beginning of the next century.

"What do we see? What we see as we look ahead five years, ten years, perhaps it is fifteen, but in any event, within our time, we see five great economic super powers -- the U.S., Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Mainland China, and of course, Japan." ¹⁰⁹

Resuming trade with China and allowing her out of isolation and hostility will bring benefits not only to the United States but to all nations. Nixon said "The very success of our policy of ending the isolation of Mainland China will mean an immense escalation of their economic challenge not only to us but to others in the world." ¹¹⁰





¹⁰⁸ Nixon Trade Speech given by President Nixon in Kansas City July 6, 1971. See attached document, p.105

¹⁰⁹ Nixon Trade Speech given by President Nixon in Kansas City July 6, 1971. See attached document, p.107

¹¹⁰ Nixon Trade Speech given by President Nixon in Kansas City July 6, 1971. See attached document, p.106

In the article "Asia after Vietnam," in the October, 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs, President Nixon said : "Military security has to rest ultimately on economic and political stability."

The most urgent issue for the future is probably a combination of stability and economic development. Militarism is now losing its priority. Military confrontation is now no longer the first choice to solve world conflicts. In recent decades, militarism not only didn't satisfactorily solve any problem or conflict between East and West between Capitalism and



to rise high in Asia as well as in the rest of the world. ¹¹¹

Capital and technology can be considered as weapons used to support diplomatic and political policies designed to resolve world problems while military measures are losing their efficiency and usefulness as a means of solving conflicts between nations.

Since the restoration of American-Chinese diplomatic relations, hundreds of thousands of Chinese students have been sent to the United States and other industrialized nations to study. Billions of dollars from the United States and Japan have been invested in China just like an army armed with new weapons : " Peace, Cooperation and a Share of the Profits." These investments, though, do not immediately bring about big returns, but with time, and with their gradual absorption, they will result in enormous benefits.

The exchange of culture, the increase in trade, the sharing of scientific and technological advancements will tend to alter the thinking of mankind and the behavior of society.

Reality has proved that to be true. China of today, as compared with the previous decades, has made great progress in reforms and innovations. The exchange of culture, education, science and technology

¹¹¹ A. Doak Barnett, China Policy Old Problem and New Challenges (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 78-121; Gene T. Hsiao, Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1974) pp. 16-20; Gregory C.. Chow, The Chinese Economy (New York: Harper & Row, Publisher, Inc. 1985); "China party chief urges more openness", San Jose Mercury News, March 21, 1988, p. 11A.

has been bringing about reforms in society, the law and even politics. The ideology of Marxism is disappearing and giving way to pragmatism with its bold innovations, especially in the economic field.¹¹²

Economic progress, the interrelationship in foreign trade and the pursuit of common interests between the United States and China have gradually reduced political conflicts and military pressures. Hostility, containment and embargo have given way to compromise, reconciliation and peace.

Besides the economic benefits jointly shared by the United States and China, the normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China are also bringing about vast opportunities for the world in general and for Asian nations of the Pacific rim in particular

As mentioned above, the normalization of relations with China has the effect of bringing China back into the world community, dismantling the policies of embargo and isolation. The United States has also set a precedent for world policy. Between Communism and Capitalism, besides the differences in ideologies, there exists a vast terrain of mutually

¹¹² "Bankruptcy law goes into effect in China", Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 Nov. 1988, p.12; "Too far too fast?", Time, Oct.10, 1988, pp. 50-52; "A Maoist Commune challenges Deng's reforms", Newsweek, June 27, 1988, p. 39.; "Property to the people", Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 Dec. 1988, pp. 12, 13; "Market makers", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 Feb. 1989, p. 48; "China and U.S. reach accord on Satellites", Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 Dec. 1988, p. 8; "Make industry private, Chinese economists urge", San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 10, 1989, p. 2A; "Bush's trip to China is marred as police bar dissidents from gala", San Jose Mercury News, Feb.27, 1989, pp. 1A, 16A.

benefiting cooperation. Differences in ideologies are no longer fences which obstruct and divide other international relations such as cultural, economic and technical cooperations. The decisions of the United States as the leader of the free world have set an example for other small nations within the orbit of the United States to adjust their policies in accordance with new needs and changes.

The new China resulting from President Nixon's China policy rejuvenated Asian nations and countries of the Pacific rim such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand . These countries have looked to China for help with their own challenges of economic development and political modernization.

The world economic centers of previous decades are losing their influence. The emergence of Japan as an economic superpower, the opening up of the Mainland China market and the outstanding progress of Korea and other countries of the Pacific rim will surely contribute a great deal to the international economic activities and disturb or even destroy the previous balance in world economic powers.¹¹³

The world of bipolarity is dissolving itself gradually. The decision to normalize relations with China was an event that politically destroyed

¹¹³ Lawrence B. Krause and Suet Sekiguchi, Economic Interaction in the Pacific Rim (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980) pp. 51-76, 117-137; "From Superrich to Superpower", Time, July 4, 1988, pp. 28-31; "Hour of Power", Newsweek, Feb. 27, 1989, pp. 14-18; "Yen power goes global", Time, August 8, 1988, pp.26-29; "The Cop and the Benefactor", Newsweek, Feb. 6, 1989, pp. 36,40 "Asia's new economic tiger", Newsweek, July 11, 1988, p.52; "The Pacific century", Newsweek, Feb. 22, 1988, pp. 43-62; "U.S. exports to Asia lagging-despite 40 percent rise in 1988" San Francisco Chronicle

the bipolarity of the market and created more poles for the international economy. A new world of economic and political multipolarity is developing. By destroying the isolation of China, bringing one-fifth of the world population back into the world community, the United States made a globally strategic decision that no one can deny.


President Nixon brought the world into a new era, the era of reconciliation and cooperation.

Another aspect deserves study. By recognizing China as a nuclear power in Asia, sharing interest with her in the international affairs of the area and helping her to become an economic power, the United States has been instrumental in increasing China's power and influence. With its natural and human resources, nuclear power and economic progress, China will soon become a world power strong enough to compete with the Soviet Union in the region and to obstruct any single power from monopolizing influence in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific Ocean. When a multilateral balance of power does prevail, peace and security in the region will be guaranteed especially for the Southeast Asian nations.

Thus, through sharing interests, as at present, an economic lever has become a formula to resolve military and political conflicts. When human beings' necessities such as food and shelter are taken care of, they can become weapons capable of settling disputes. Political ideologies and the "isms" have now lost their supremacy in the context of international relations and have ceased to be an obstruction to useful

relationships between members of the international community. ¹¹⁴

Military, political, economic measures and diplomatic relations
are the means that people can use to resolve international disputes



time economic measures can prove to be positive and superior to all other
alternatives. Will violence at last subside and give way to peaceful
solutions aimed at serving humanity? It is time for a new

the results that have been brought about. A decade is a long time for an individual but for the political policies of a nation and of the earth it is barely enough time to look at every factor objectively or subjectively, superficially or profoundly, the immediate or the remote to know its purposes and consequences.

In the light of this observation, the normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, and consequently, its impact on the U.S. and China and the world community is now rewarding us with enough data to study, but each individual with a different viewpoint based on his or her own knowledge and beliefs certainly cannot have a complete view of every aspect of the problem.


In the present state of international society with important changes in the Soviet Union and China and the reorientation of international powers, the policies of the United States under the Nixon Administration were the cornerstone for the transformation of the world. They opened up a new era for mankind. Consequently, all laws and regulations have to be redefined in order to stay viable and must be adapt to the new international relationship conditions in order to create a new atmosphere for the world community.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ "Paint the town red", Time, Dec. 12, 1988, pp. 20-22; "Plus ca change ..." Time, June 6, 1988, pp. 12,13; "Talking to Gorbachev", Newsweek, May 30, 1988, pp. 24-26, 31-35; "Reagan in Moscow", Newsweek, June 6, 1988, pp. 16-19; "The Gorbachev challenge", Time, Dec. 19, 1988, pp. 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23;; "He does not envy us", Newsweek, Dec.14, 1987, pp. 19-25.

With these changes it is hoped that humanity will organize a dynamic stability and aspiration toward peace for some period of time before new conditions will push us toward new cycles of changes in history. The super powers, with their glory and influence in the aftermath of the Second World War have now slipped into the background. New world powers, new economic and political centers are emerging, eclipsing the absolute superiority found in the old system. Economic and political theories are undergoing big adjustments, not only in the socialist systems but in the capitalist systems as well.¹¹⁶

Change in the world's political order is inevitable, yet the speed and extent of change lend themselves to human input. Nixon's policies should be seen in this context.

Where are Capitalism and Communism going? Will they tend to meet each other in a new relationship or will they confront each other in a nuclear war and cause total destruction for the world? Any prediction would lack scientific character. Based on present trends, it is likely that



aiming for our survival and the development of humanism from which



" Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition-not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life of men ... With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the hungry ... ¹¹⁷

" What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we have the vision to build a new world ... " ¹¹⁸

TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO U.S - CHINA RELATIONS.

SOURCES:

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C.

1955 FORMOSA RESOLUTION

The joint resolution (H J Res 159, S J Res 28), authorizing the president's use of armed forces to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, cleared the House Jan 25, 1955, by a 410-2 roll call vote, and the

Senate Jan. 28, 1955, by a 85-3 roll-call vote. It was repealed Oct. 111, 1974.

The following is the full text:

"Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

"Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been made and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for

"Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the western Pacific island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

"Whereas the President of the United States on Jan. 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a mutual defense treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Ocean on one of them will be regarded as an armed attack on the other;

"This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions, created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to Congress."

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND CHINA

*President Nixon's second annual State of the World Report, delivered
Jan 25, 1971. Excerpts below deal with his policies with regard to the*

...In the last twenty years, the nature of the Communist challenge has been transformed. The Stalinist block has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine and power. One of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union. The most prevalent Communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mix of military, psychological and political pressures. These

including those with whom we have ties, to view undertakings as a dynamic process. Maintaining the integrity of commitments requires relating their tangible expression, such as troop deployments or financial contributions, to changing conditions.

The concrete results vary. In south Korea fewer U.S. troops are required, but Korean forces must receive more modern equipment. In NATO a continuing level of U.S. forces and greater European contributions are in order. The best way of maintaining stable relationships with our allies is jointly to reach common conclusions and jointly to act on them...








"Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security..."

"Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense...."

The People's Republic of China faces perhaps the most severe problem of all in adjusting her policies to the realities of modern Asia. With a population eight times greater than that of Japan, and possessing a much greater resource base, Mainland China nonetheless sees the free Japanese economy producing a gross national product two and a half times that of her own. The remarkable success of the Chinese people within the free economic setting of Taiwan and Singapore, and the contributions of the

overseas Chinese to growth elsewhere in Asia, stands as a eloquent rebuttal to Peking's claim of unique insight and wisdom in organizing the talents of the Chinese people.

The People's Republic of China is making a claim to leadership of the less developed portions of the world. But for the claim to be credible, and for it to be pursued effectively, Communist China must expose herself to



historically shaped attitudes have been sharpened by doctrines of violence and revolution, proclaimed more often than followed as principles in foreign relations.

Another factor determining Communist Chinese conduct is the intense and dangerous conflict with the USSR. It has its roots in the historical development of the vast border areas between the two countries. It is aggravated by contemporary ideological hostility, by power rivalry and nationalist antagonisms.

A clash between these two great powers is inconsistent with the kind of stable Asian structure we seek. We, therefore, see no advantage to us in the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China. We do not seek any. We will do nothing to sharpen that conflict--nor to encourage it. It is absurd to believe that we could collude with one of the parties against the other. We have taken great pains to make it clear that we are not attempting to do so.

At the same time, we cannot permit either Communist China or the USSR to dictate our policies and conduct toward the other. We recognize that one effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict could be to propel both countries into poses of militancy toward the non-communist world in order to validate their credentials as revolutionary centers. It is also possible that

We are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking. We cannot accept its ideological percepts, or the notion that communist China must exercise hegemony over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests.

The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own commitments. Our attitude is public and clear. We will continue to honor our treaty commitments to the security of our Asian allies. An honorable relationship with Peking cannot be constructed at their expense.

Among these allies is the Republic of China. We have been associated with that government since its inception in 1911, and with particular intimacy when we were World War II allies. These were among the considerations behind the American decision to assist the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan with its defense and economic needs.


Our present commitment to the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan stems from our 1954 treaty. The purpose of the treaty is exclusively defensive, and it controls the entire range of our military relationship with the Republic of China.

Our economic assistance to the Republic of China has had gratifying results. Beginning in 1951, the U.S. provided \$1.5 billion in economic assistance. Its effective and imaginative use by the Government of the Republic of China and the people of Taiwan made it possible for us to terminate the program in 1965.

I am recalling the record of friendship, assistance, and alliance between the United States and the Government of the Republic of China in order to make clear both the vitality of this relationship and the nature of our defense relationship. I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. As I have tried to make clear since the beginning of my administration, while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the differences between Taipei and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved by peaceful means.

In that connection, I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations. The question of its place in the United Nations is not, however, merely a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation. For a number of years attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of China of its place as a member of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. We have opposed these attempts. We will continue to oppose them.

The past four years have been a period of internal turmoil and upheaval in Mainland China. A calmer mood now seems to be developing. There could be new opportunities for the People's Republic of China to



For the United States the development of a relationship with Peking embodies precisely the challenges of this decade: to deal with, and resolve, the vestiges of the postwar period that continue to influence our relationship, and to create a balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake. We believe that such a structure should provide full scope for the influence to which China's achievements entitle it.

We continue to believe that practical measures on our part will, over time, make evident to the leaders in Peking that we are prepared for a serious dialogue. In the past year we took several steps:

-In January and February of 1970, two meetings were held between our representatives in Warsaw, thus restoring an important channel of communication. The subsequent canceling of the scheduled May meeting was at Chinese initiative.

-In April, we authorized the selective licensing of goods for export to the People's Republic of China.

-In August, certain restrictions were lifted on American oil companies operating abroad, so that most foreign ships could use American-owned bunkering facilities on voyages to and from Mainland Chinese ports.

-During 1970, the passports of 270 Americans were validated for travel to the People's Republic of China. This brought to nearly 1,000 the number so validated. Regrettably, only three holders of such passports were permitted entry to China.

In the coming year, I will carefully examine what further steps we might take to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles to the realization of these opportunities. We hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of, reciprocity.

We should, however, be totally realistic about the prospects. The People's Republic of China continues to convey to its own people and to the world its determination to cast us in the devil's role. Our modest efforts to prove otherwise have not reduced Peking's doctrinaire enmity toward us. So long as this is true, so long as Peking continues to be adamant for hostility, there is little we can do by ourselves to improve the relationship. What we can do, we will....

NIXON'S FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Following are excerpts of President Nixon's Jan. 20, 1969, inaugural address, which established the basis for the "Nixon Doctrine."

...The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker. This honor now beckons America--the chance to help lead the world at last out of the valley of turmoil and onto that high ground of peace that man has dreamed of since the dawn of civilization.

If we succeed, generations to come will say of us now living that we mastered our moment, that we helped make the world safe for mankind.

This is our summons to greatness. I believe the American People are ready to answer this call.

The second third of this century has been a time of proud achievement. We have made enormous strides in science and industry and agriculture. We have shared our wealth more broadly than ever. We have learned at last to manage a modern economy to assure its continued growth. We have given freedom new reach. We have begun to make its promise real for black as well as for white.

We see the hope of tomorrow in the youth of today. I know America's youth. I believe in them. We can be proud that they are better educated, more committed, more passionately driven by conscience than any generation in our history.

No people has ever been so close to the achievement of a just and abundant society, or so possessed of the will to achieve it. And because our strengths are so great, we can afford to appraise our weaknesses with candor and to approach them with hope.

Standing in this same place a third of a century ago, Franklin Delano Roosevelt addressed a nation ravaged by depression and gripped in fear. He could say in surveying the nation's troubles: "They concern, thank God, only material things."

Our crisis today is in reverse.

We have found ourselves rich in goods, but ragged in spirit; reaching with magnificent precision for the moon, but falling into raucous discord on earth.

We are caught in war, wanting peace. We are torn by division, wanting unity. We see around us empty lives, wanting fulfillment. We see tasks that need doing, waiting for hands to do them.

To a crisis of the spirit, we need an answer of the spirit.

And to find that answer, we need only look within ourselves. When we listen to "the better angels of our nature," we find that they celebrate the simple things, the basic things--such as goodness, decency, love, kindness.

"To Lower Our Voices"

Greatness comes in simple trappings.

The simple things are the ones most needed today if we are to surmount what divides us, and cement what unites us.

To lower our voices would be a simple thing.

In these difficult years, America has suffered from a fever of words; from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontent into hatred; from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of persuading.

We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices.

For its part, government will listen. We will strive to listen in new way--to the voices of quiet anguish, the voices that speak without words, the voices of the heart--the injured voices, the anxious voices, the voices that have despaired of being heard.

Those who have been left out, we will try to bring in.

Those left behind, we will help to catch up. For all of our people, we will set as our goal the decent order that makes progress possible and our lives secure.

As we reach toward our hopes, our task is to build on what has gone before--not turning away from the old, but turning toward the new.

In this past third of a century, government has passed more laws, spent more money, initiated more programs, than in all our previous history.

In pursuing our goals of full employment, better housing, excellence in education; in rebuilding our cities and improving our rural areas; in protecting our environment and enhancing the quality of life; in all these and more, we will and must press urgently forward.

We shall plan now for the day when our wealth can be transferred from the destruction of war abroad to the urgent needs of our people at home.

The American dream does not come to those who fall asleep.

Limits of Government

But we are approaching the limits of what government alone can do.

Our greatest need now is to reach beyond government, to enlist the legions of the concerned and the committed.

What has to be done, has to be done by government and people together or it will not be done at all. The lesson of past agony is that without the people we can do nothing; with the people we can do everything.

To match the magnitude of our tasks, we need the energies of our people--enlisted not only in grand enterprises, but more importantly in those small, splendid efforts that make headlines in the neighborhood newspaper instead of the national journal.

With these, we can build a great cathedral of the spirit--each of us raising it one stone at a time, as he reaches out to his neighbor, helping caring, doing.

I do not offer a life of uninspiring ease. I do not call for a life of grim sacrifice. I ask you to join in a high adventure--one as rich as humanity itself, and exciting as the times we live in.

The essence of freedom is that each of us shares in the shaping of his own destiny.

Until he has been part of a cause larger than himself, no man is truly whole.

The way to fulfillment is in the use of our talents. We achieve nobility in the spirit that inspires that use.

As we measure what can be done, we shall promise only what we know we can produce, but as we chart our goals, we shall be lifted by our dreams.

No man can be fully free while his neighbor is not. To go forward at all is to go forward together.

This means black and white together, as one nation, not two. The laws have caught up with our conscience. What remains is to give life to what is in the law; to insure at last that as all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in dignity before man.

As we learn to go forward together at home, let us also seek to go forward together with all mankind.

Let us take as our goal: where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent.

Era of Negotiation

After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.

Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open.

We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people, a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.

We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.

Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition--not in conquering territory or extending domination, but in enriching the life of man.

As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together--not as new worlds to be conquered, but as new adventure to be shared.

With those who are willing to join, let us negotiate to reduce the

burden of arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the hungry.

But to all those who would be tempted by weakness, let us leave no doubt that we will be as strong as we need to be for as long as we need to be.

Over the past 20 years, since I first came to this Capital as a

I have come to know the leaders of the world, and the great forces, the hatred, the fears that divide the world.

I know that peace does not come through wishing for it--that there is no substitute for days and even years of patient and prolonged diplomacy.

I also know the people of the world.

I have seen the hunger of a homeless child, the pain of a man wounded in battle, the grief of a mother who has lost her son. I know these have no ideology, no race.

I know America. I know the heart of America is good.

I speak from my own heart, and the heart of my country, the deep concern we have for those who suffer, and those who sorrow.

I have taken an oath today in the presence of God and my countrymen to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. To that oath I now add this sacred commitment: I shall consecrate my office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon to the cause off peace among nations.

The American spirit

Let this message be heard by strong and weak alike:

The peace we seek--the peace we seek to win--is not victory over any other people, but the peace that comes "with healing in its wings"; with compassion for those who have suffered; with understanding for those who

have suffered--with the opportunity for all to understand and to

Only a few short weeks ago we shared the glory of man's first sight of the world as God sees it, as a single sphere reflecting light in the darkness.

As the Apollo Astronauts flew over the moon's gray surface on Christmas eve, they spoke to us of the beauty of earth--and in that voice so clear across the lunar distance, we heard them invoke God's blessing on its goodness.

In that moment, their view from the moon moved poet Archibald MacLeish to write: "To see the earth as it truly is, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats, is to see ourselves as riders on the Earth together, brothers in that bright loveliness in the eternal cold--brothers who know now they are truly brothers."

In that moment of surpassing technological triumph, we turned

their thoughts toward home and humanity--seeing in that far perspective that man's destiny on earth on earth is not divisible; telling us that however far we reach into the cosmos, our destiny lies not in the stars but on earth itself, in our own hands, in our own hearts.

NIXON TRADE SPEECH

Following are excerpts of a speech given by President Nixon to midwestern news media executives attending a briefing on domestic policy in Kansas City, Mo., July 6, 1971.

...Japan, with 100 million people, produces more than Mainland China, with 800 million people. But that should not mislead us, and it gives us, and should give none of the potential competitors in world markets of Mainland China, any sense of satisfaction that it will always be that way. Because when we see the Chinese as people--and I have seen them all over the world, and some of you have, too, whether in Hong Kong, or whether in Taiwan, or whether they are in Singapore or Bangkok, any of the great cities, Manila, where Chinese are there--they are creative, they are productive, they are one of the most capable people in the world. And 800 million Chinese are going to be, inevitably, an enormous economic power, with all that that means in terms of what they could be in other areas if they move in that direction.

That is the reason why I felt that it was essential that this Administration take the first steps toward ending the isolation of Mainland China from the world community. We had to take those steps because the Soviet Union could not, because of differences that they have that at the present time seem to be irreconcilable. We were the only other power that could take those steps

Let me be very, shall I say, limited in what I would discuss on this particular issue, because we should not consider that more has happened than has happened. What we have done is simply opened the door--opened the door for travel, opened the door for trade.

Now the question is whether there will be other doors opened on their part. But at least the doors must be opened and the goal of U.S. policy must be, in the long term, ending the isolation of Mainland China and a normalization of our relations with Mainland China because, looking down the road--and let's just look ahead 15-20 years--the United States could have a perfectly effective agreement with the Soviet Union for limitation of arms; the danger of any confrontation there might have been almost totally removed.

But Mainland China, outside the world community, completely isolated, with its leaders not in communication with world leaders, would be a danger to the whole world that would be unacceptable, unacceptable to us and unacceptable to others as well.

So consequently, this step must be taken now. Others must be taken, very precisely, very deliberately, as there is reciprocation on the

other side. But now let's see how this all fits into the economic program that I mentioned a moment ago, and the economic challenge. The very success of our policy of ending the isolation of Mainland China will mean an immense escalation of their economic challenge not only to us but to others in the world.

I again come back to the fundamental point: 800 million Chinese, open to the world, with all the communication and the interchange of ideas that inevitably will occur as a result of that opening, will become an economic force in the world of enormous potential.

So, in sum, what do we see? What we see as we look ahead 5 years, 10 years, perhaps it is 15, but in any event, within our time, we see five great economic super powers: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Mainland China, and, of course, Japan....

CHOU EN-LAI, NIXON TOASTS

The following toasts were exchanged in Peking, Feb. 21, 1972, during Nixon's visit.

Chou En-Lai. Mr. President and Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades and friends:

First of all, I have the pleasure on behalf of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Government to extend our welcome to Mr. President and Mrs. Nixon and to our other American guests. I also wish to take this opportunity to extend on behalf of the Chinese people cordial greetings to the American people on the other side of the great ocean.

President Nixon's visit to our country at the invitation of the Chinese Government provides the leaders of the two countries with an opportunity of meeting in person to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides. This is a positive move in conformity with the desire of the Chinese and American peoples and an event

unprecedented in the history of the relations between China and the United States.

The American people are a great people. The Chinese people are a great people. The peoples of our two countries have always been friendly to each other. But owing to reasons known to all, contacts between the two peoples were suspended for over 20 years. Now, through the common efforts of China and the United States, the gate to friendly contacts has finally been opened. At the present time it has become a strong desire of the Chinese and American peoples to promote the normalization of relations between the two countries and work for the relaxation of tension. The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history. We are confident that the day will surely come when this common desire of our two peoples will be realized.

The social systems of China and the United States are fundamentally different, and there exist great differences between the Chinese Government and the United States Government. However, these differences should not hinder China and the United States from establishing normal state relations on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence: still less should they lead to

war. As early as 1955 the Chinese Government publicly stated that the Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States and that the Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government.

This is a policy which we have pursued consistently. We have taken note of the fact that in his speech before setting out for China President Nixon on his part said that "what we must do is to find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war."

We hope that, through a frank exchange of views between our two sides to gain a clearer notion of our differences and make efforts to find common ground, a new start can be made in the relations between our two countries.

President Nixon. Mr. Prime Minister and all of your distinguished guests this evening.

Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks. At this very moment, through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.

As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, the American people are a great people. If our two people are enemies the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased.

In the spirit of frankness which I hope will characterize your talks this week, let us recognize at the outset these points: We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend

those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.

So, let us, in these next 5 days, start a long march together, not in lock step, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice in which all may stand together with equal dignity and in which each nation, large or small, has a right to determine its own form of government, free of outside interference or domination. The world watches. The world listens. The world waits to see what we will do. What is the world? In a personal sense, I think of my eldest daughter whose birthday is today. As I think of her, I think of all the children in the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in the Americas, most of whom were born since the date of the foundation of the People's Republic of China.

What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we have the vision to build a new world?

There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other; neither of us seeks domination over the other; neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.

Chairman Mao has written, "So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently. The world rolls on. Time passes. Ten thousands years are too long. Seize the day, seize the hour."

This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.

In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Chou, and to the friendship to the Chinese and American people which can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.

1972 SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

Following is the joint U.S.-China communique issued at Shanghai, Feb. 27, 1972, at the conclusion of President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China:

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the Invitation of Premier Chou En-Lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972.

Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.


During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-Lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei [Ji Pengfei] held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured

Hangchow [Hangzhou] and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace; just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies as to



lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect

forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and

that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations

resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereign and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relation in mind the two sides stated that:

- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;





- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony ; and

- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, Two governments," "two China," an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."



The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United State Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the

be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

NIXON ON CHINA TALKS

Excerpts form President Nixon's remarks made at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., on his return from Peking, Feb. 28, 1972:

...When I announced this trip last July, I described it as a journey for peace . In the last 30 years, Americans have in three different wars gone off by the hundreds of thousands to fight, and some to die, in Asia and in the Pacific. One of the central motives behind my journey to China was to prevent that from happening a fourth time to another generation of Americans.

As I have often said, peace means more than the mere absence of war. In a technical sense, we were at peace with the People's Republic of China before this trip, but a gulf of almost 12,000 miles and 22 years of noncommunication and hostility separated the United States of America from the 750 million people who live in the Pèople's Republic of China, and that is one-fourth of all the people in the world.

As a result of this trip, we have started the long process of building a bridge across that gulf, and even now we have something better than the mere absence of war. Not only have we completed a week of intensive talks at the highest levels, we have set up a procedure whereby we can continue to have discussions in the future. We have

demonstrated that nations with very deep and fundamental differences can learn to discuss those differences calmly, rationally, and frankly, without compromising their principles. This is the basis of a structure for peace, where we can talk about differences rather than fight about them.

The primary goal of this trip was to reestablish communication with the People's Republic of China after a generation of hostility. We achieved that goal. Let me turn now to our joint communique.

We did not bring back any written or unwritten agreements that will guarantee peace in our time. We did not bring home any magic formula which will make necessary the efforts of the American people to continue to maintain the strength so that we can continue to be free.

We made some necessary and important beginnings, however, in several areas. We entered into agreements to expand cultural, educational, and journalistic contacts between the Chinese and the American people. We agreed to work to begin and broaden trade between our two countries. We have agreed that the communications that have now been established between our governments will be strengthened and expanded.


Most important, we have agreed on some rules of international conduct which will reduce the risk of confrontation and war in Asia and in the Pacific.

We agreed that we are opposed to domination of the Pacific area by any one power. We agreed that international disputes should be settled without the use of the threat of force and we agreed that we are prepared to apply this principle to our mutual relations.

With respect to Taiwan, we stated our established policy that our forces overseas will be reduced gradually as tensions ease, and that our ultimate objective is to withdraw our forces as a peaceful settlement is achieved.

We have agreed that we will not negotiate the fate of other nations behind their backs, and we did not do so at Peking. There were no secret deals of any kind. We have done all this without giving up any United States commitment to any other country.

~~By now, the talks that I had with the leaders of the People's~~



Republic and that the Secretary of State had with the office of the Government of the People's in the foreign affairs area, we both realized that a bridge of understanding that spans almost 12,000 miles and 22 years of hostility can't be built in one week of discussions. But we have agreed to begin to build that bridge, recognizing that our work will require years of patient effort. We made no attempt pretend that major differences did not exist between our two governments, because they do exist.

This communique was unique in honestly setting forth differences rather than trying to cover them up with diplomatic doubletalk.

Just as we hope that those saplings, those tiny saplings that we left in China, will grow one day into mighty redwoods, so we hope, too, that the seeds planted on this journey for peace will grow and prosper into a more enduring structure for peace and security in the Western Pacific.

But peace is too urgent to wait for centuries. We must seize the moment to move toward that goal now, and this is what we have done on this journey.

As I am sure you realize, it was a great experience for us to see the timeless wonders of ancient China, the changes that are being made in modern China. And one fact stands out, among many others, from my talks with the Chinese leaders. It is their total belief, their total dedication, to their system of government. That is their right, just as it is the right of any country to choose the kind of government it wants.

But as I return from this trip, just as has been the case on my return from other trips abroad which have taken me to over 80 countries, I come back to America with an even stronger faith in our system of government.

As I flew across America today, all the way from Alaska, over the Rockies, the Plains, and then on to Washington, I thought of the greatness of our country and, most of all, I thought of the freedom, the opportunity, the progress that 200 million Americans are privileged to enjoy. I realized again this is a beautiful country. And tonight my prayer and my hope is that as a result of this trip, our children will have a better chance to grow up in a peaceful world.....